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Werner Sombart’s classic text Luxury and Capitalism is revisited in the light of recent 
economic historians’ works that have analyzed luxury’s role in the development of capitalism.  
Most of these works, as well as Sombart’s book itself, are focused on the eighteenth century, 
since it was then that the proliferation—and availability—of luxury manifested itself for the 
first time most conspicuously.  By employing secondary texts by economic historians and 
primary sources from the debates on luxury in the eighteenth century—some of which 
overlooked by a number of historians—the essay attempts a renewed outlook on a text that 
was controversial when written over a century ago and remains a prominent argument in the 
eternal discussion and dispute on the cause(s) of the rise of capitalism. 
 





Werner Sombart’s Luxury and Capitalism has occupied a peripheral though captivating place 
in the theory for the rise of capitalism.  Sombart’s contemporary Max Weber and his theories 
have enjoyed much more currency; I venture to say that that is mainly due to the fact that 
Weber posited a history of the idea of capitalism, which is attractive and easily relatable—
though surely not without flaws—while Sombart’s saw economic exigencies that are harder to 
examine specifically, for they demand very broad historical bearings, and are even harder to 
test.  Sombart’s idea is relatively straightforward: luxury and its pursuit were of cardinal 
importance for the development of capitalism.  But though this theory is exceedingly 
intelligible, testing it as well as its ramifications is an almost impossible task. Sombart 
focuses on the eighteenth century—for it was then that luxury became more widely available 
and sought after—and situates in it the crucial fastening of some of the classic and 
acknowledged factors of the capitalistic system—the division of labor, the rise of new 
markets, and the resulting capital accumulation—which he saw specifically tied to luxury’s 
intensification; in fact, Sombart called capitalism the ‘illicit child of luxury’ (Sombart, 1967, 
p.27).  Sombart hypothesizes that the courts and the feminization of taste, which saw their 
zenith in the eighteenth century, fomented luxury’s increase. The other reason for the 
extravagant growth of luxury is, according to Sombart (1967, p.81) the ‘emergence of the 
homo novus’: the bourgeois who lived in a hierarchical society had to prove himself and his 
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self-worth—pun intended—and thus necessitated a new, heightened degree of luxury.  This 
further increased the demand for luxury, which according to Sombart specifically resulted in 
the creation of new markets that expanded the economy: as the desire for luxury grew 
immensely, so did the markets to accommodate it.   
 
The ‘de-Moralization of Luxury’ 
 
In synthesis, this is Sombart’s thesis.  In order to consider his theory appropriately, we ought 
to look at eighteenth century debates on luxury, since Sombart heavily drew upon them, but 
we shall not be concerned with the moral aspect of the debates, for it should be noted that 
numerous writers exhibited powerful moral dilemmas toward luxury and its rise that often 
prevent a purely economic investigation, which is our main task: the condemnations on 
luxury by a Rousseau, a Fénelon, a Walwyn, a Hutchenson and others are surely fundamental 
to the history of the ‘idea of luxury’ as well as to cultural history, but have no bearing on our 
considerations.  Indeed, Sombart himself thought so too when he stated that ‘time and time 
again the problem of luxury has been approached with all the ethical fervor of the solid and 
thrifty bourgeois, and moralizing arguments have been brought into play for every phase of 
the question.  And so, on the relationship between luxury and the market few had anything 
important to say.’ (Sombart, 1967, p.116) 
 
However, those who saw luxury exclusively through moral lenses should not obfuscate our 
own view of a very important circumstance that despite being tied to moral considerations 
had important economic effects during the eighteenth century—that is, what Christopher 
Berry called ‘the de-moralization of luxury’.  Those who de-moralized luxury are the crucial 
writers to survey, for they regarded luxury’s economic office over its moral implications; as 
Maxine Berg (2003, p.7) has stated quite correctly, ‘luxury gradually lost its former 
associations with corruption and vice, and came to include production, trade and the civilizing 
impact of superfluous commodities.’ Christopher Berry, too, makes a subtler and more wide-
ranging observation when he remarks that, ‘central to this de-moralization is the re-evaluation 
of mundane life.  From being deprecated because of its concern with the recurrent necessities 
of everyday living […] it is within this necessity that a new source of certainty could be 
located […] because the ‘modern psychology’ itself identifies a certainty and predictability by 
virtue of man’s material nature.’ (Berry, 1994, p.114) Both Berg and Berry tangentially 
support Sombart’s view of luxury’s economic impact.  But Berry’s view that man’s material 
nature was per se positive is both significant and historically entrenched in a burgeoning 
reality, for the forces of secularization, which accelerated significantly after the Peace of 
Westfalia of 1648, kept weakening the worth of ascetic, contemplative life; and mundane 
pleasures became increasingly acceptable.  The ‘de-moralization of luxury’, which 
Christopher Berry chronicles so well in his homonymous chapter, started assuming a 
significant extent around 17001, and thus began to have relevant economic impact.  The ‘de-
moralization’ that luxury underwent during the eighteenth century ought to be understood and 
kept well in mind as an essential prerequisite if we are to accept or even consider any of 
                                                 
1
‘The great divide in the perception of the beauty of life comes much more between the Renaissance 
and the modern period than between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. […] For the medieval man 
enjoyment per se is sinful.  The Renaissance had managed to free itself from the rejection of all the joy 
of life as something sinful, but had not yet found a new way of separating the higher and lower 
enjoyments of life; the Renaissance wanted an unencumbered enjoyment of all of life.  The new 
distinction is the compromise between the Renaissance and Puritanism that is at the base of modern 
spiritual attitudes.  It amounted to a mutual capitulation in which one side insisted on saving beauty 
while the other insisted on the condemnation of sin.  […] Only after the Puritan worldview lost its 
intensity did the Renaissance receptiveness to all the joys of life gain ground again; perhaps even more 
ground than before, because beginning the eighteenth century there is a tendency to regard the natural 
per se as an element of the ethically good.  Anyone attempting to draw the dividing line between the 
higher and lower enjoyments of life according to the dictates of ethical consciousness would no longer 
separate art from sensuous enjoyment, the enjoyment of nature from the cult of the body, the elevated 
from the natural, but would only separate egotism, lies, and vanity from purity.’ (Huizinga, 1996, p.40) 
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Sombart’s views.  Furthermore, the separation of the moral and economic aspects of luxury 
had the important consequence of distinguishing the effect of luxury on the nation as opposed 
to that on the individual, which encouraged thinkers to look at luxury in exclusively economic 
terms completely divested from moral implications.  In fact, Christopher Berry cites a treatise 
by Nicholas Barbon—Discourse on Trade from 1690—which according to Berry was the first 
to make a distinction between the repercussions of luxury on nation and individual separately. 
  
The firm separation of luxury’s moral and economic matters was precisely the great 
contribution of Hume’s seminal essay on luxury, Of Refinement in the Arts, which saw luxury 
under a positive light for its contribution to commerce: ‘Luxury nourishes commerce and 
industry.’ (Hume, 1904, p.284) A number of writers, especially in France had already grasped 
the favorable implications of luxury.  From Voltaire’s famous and typically tart remark, “Le 
supeflu chose très nécessaire” (The superfluous—a great necessity) to François Melon’s 
sapient observation that, ‘Diamonds are brought from very distant Countries, and we pay 
Silver for them: But we do not go on Purpose, and at great Expense to seek them.  It is a part 
of general Commerce, and Diamonds make a new Value of Circulation, which is received 
through the World’ (Melon, 2003, p.264), luxury increasingly shone of a new, lustrous light.   
 
Yet it would be a mistaken assumption to imagine a straight, immutable progression in the 
rehabilitation of luxury: ‘there was no simple progression from disapprobation to 
endorsement of luxury, but rather, a dialectical debate which centered on questions of 
individual and national virtue, economic expansion and canons of taste, definitions of self and 
the social redistribution of wealth.’ (Berg, Eager, 2003, p.8) 
 
Louis-Sebastien Mercier’s writings provide an interesting counter-dialectic to the sanctioning 
of luxury.  In his Tableaux de Paris, Mercier had a very critical view of luxury in the capital, 
for ‘Mercier was continuously appalled by the luxuries he saw in Paris (Berg, Eager, 2003, 
p.21) Mercier’s copious memories have furnished historians an invaluable description of 
every-day life in Paris in the years before the end of the Ancien Régime: Sombart cited 
Mercier’s criticism of luxury often—‘luxe, bureau des riches’ (Sombart, 1967, p.62) i.e. 
luxury, the executioner of the rich—as proof that luxury had indeed reached staggering 
proportions.  But Mercier’s dissenting views on luxury were beyond the merely moralistic, 
and, Sombart overlooked that Mercier’s argument was primarily economic—at least in 
Mercier’s view.  It is fair to note that it was Mercier’s works from the 1780s that have mostly 
been consulted, since historians have been fascinated by life at Paris at the eve of the 
Revolution.  However, Mercier kept memoires well before Louis XVI’s accession in 1775; 
and I located a most interesting passage written in 1772, which shows Mercier’s 
preoccupation for luxury as an economic “scourge”.  In speaking of the inflated prices of 
wine, Mercier noted that, 
 
The duty was become so excessive, that it greatly surpassed the price of the commodity.  One 
would imagine that wine was forbid by the law […] The taxes must be enormously enhanced, 
to satisfy the horrible avarice of the farmer-general; and the citizen in Paris, rich or poor, 
drinks and the nation remains impoverished by his vices. […] The first maxim that a king 
should learn is, that plentiful coffers depend upon the diminishment of vices of a people. 
(Mercier, 1772, p.144-5) 
 
Mercier condemned the exasperate search for luxurious items that every class displayed 
because he thought it was ruinous.  His reproach, however, seems to display more ethical 
import than economic acumen: after all, if indeed as Mercier suggests the yearning for luxury 
was rampant in every class, and, such behavior was a source of revenue for the state through 
taxes, why would Mercier wish for a “diminishment of vices of people” if that secured 
“plentiful coffers” for a state?  Clearly there is a confusion upon whom luxury is a scourge—
or a benefit: is it upon the state or the individual?  It seems that Mercier is unsure of which 
agent is negatively affected by luxury; and we may also question whether in fact Mercier’s 
view that luxury was ruinous economically to either agent was ever true. 
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Sombart, (1967, p.114) obviously, did not agree with Mercier and cited Montesquieu, who in 
his Esprit des Lois stated that, ‘if rich were not lavish, the poor would starve’, for according 
to him luxury was responsible for what we nowadays call trickle-down economics, as was 
indisputably elaborated by François Melon: 
 
The excessive Price paid for some trifling Provisions, which the Luxurious Man displayeth 
with Profusion […] is an Instance of the highest, and most ridiculous kind of Luxury, and yet, 
why should this extravagant Expense be exclaimed against?  The Money thus earned, would, 
if it lay in the Chest of the Luxurious Man, remain Dead to the Society.  The Gardiner 
receiveth it, and hath deserved it, as a recompense of his Labour, which is thereby excited 
again.  His Children, almost naked, are thereby clothed; they eat Bread in Plenty, enjoy better 
Health, and labour with cheerful Expectation. 
(Melon, 2003, p.262)  
 
Clearly, Montesquieu and Melon were not enthusiastic on all fronts about luxury, but neither 
could fail to overlook its resulting economic advantages.    
  
Finally, there were writers who directly opposed the restriction of luxury, because they 
thought it stifled economic growth.  Christopher Berry, produces the testimony of Dudley 
North, who in his Discourses upon Trade from 1691 wrote that, ‘countries which have 
sumptuary laws are generally poor because these countries discourage industry and 
ingenuity.’ (Berry, 1994, p.115)  Adam Smith echoed this very sentiment when he said, “It is 
the highest impertinence and presumption […] in kings and ministers, to pretend to watch 
over the economy of private people, and restrain their experience, either by sumptuary laws, 
or by prohibiting the importation of foreign luxuries.’ (Smith, 1994, p.377). Smith was 
speaking both in favor of consumption and liberty, and, against the old, hierarchical system 
that was trying to hold on to its slipping privileges with sumptuary laws. 
 
Sombart’s theory seems to be sustained by the debates that were occurring during the period 
he analyzed.  And yet, a great historian of capitalism, Fernand Braudel, dismissed Sombart’s 
view for being negligible in relation to the central factors of capitalism’s growth: Braudel 
thought that courts were an aberration, had no influence on real economic growth, and thus 
did not reflect markets or ‘real’ society.  Braudel’s faulted Sombart for his stance, which 
‘takes the development of capitalism out of the hands of ordinary entrepreneurs, and puts it 
squarely into the laps of aristocrats who did little business yet reaped the rewards from the 
economic efforts of others.’ (Mukerji, 1993, p.439)2 This quote from Braudel is that which 
Chandra Chandra Mukerji opens her article, to disputing Braudel’s contention by focusing on 
the interdependence between courtly gardens and capitalist culture in early modern France; in 
it, she demonstrates  that courts’ materialism appreciably contributed to entrepreneurs’ 
economic development and methods, thus sustaining Sombart’s view in the court’s role of 
capitalism’s spread and countering Braudel’s disputation.  But Braudel restricted Sombart’s 
argument excessively: Sombart did use the courts as an egregious example for the enormous 
urge for luxury, but he did not limit himself to them.  As we saw earlier, Sombart insisted on 
the importance of the emergence of the bourgeois, who, in his wish to carve for himself a new 
place in a changing society, wanted to replicate the courtly extravagance to sanction his right 
to be a constituent of ‘high society’, and most importantly, to his prove that birth was not a 
prerequisite for status: this had the effect of increasing the scope and availability of luxury, 
which undoubtedly fomented capitalistic development. 
  
Still, we ought not to overlook—as I think Braudel did—the contribution of courts to the 
‘turning of the wheels of commerce’, as Braudel would have stated: it is enough to read 
through the colossal expenditures for the construction of Versailles from 1660 to 1689—
which are so elephantine to be beyond computation—to conclude that it is impossible that 
they did not have an effect on the economy and the rise of new markets. 
                                                 
2Chandra Mukerji. “Reading and Writing with Nature: a Materialist Approach to French Formal 
Gardens” Consumption and the World of Goods. (London: Routedge, 1993), p.439. 




In conclusion, how are we to gauge the potency of Sombart’s ideas?  I think that Sombart’s 
idea that luxury had a role in the development of capitalism remains a fundamental 
contribution, which is clearly confirmed by most economic thinkers of the early capitalist 
period, who saw luxury as a tonic for economic growth.  It is therefore not inappropriate that 
in the introduction to Sombart’s work Philip Spiegelman declares that Luxury and Capitalism 
has ‘recently been pulled back into the orbit of contemporary academic consciousness.’ 
(Sombart, 1967, p.v)  In fact, almost a century after Sombart pioneered his idea, James Perkin 
followed suit by stating that it was consumer demand, which was ‘the most important 
economic factor in the genesis of industrialism.’ (Perkin, 2002, p.92)  And so, it is true as 
Maxine Berg holds, that the division of labor created new luxuries but it is also arguable, as 
Sombart did, that the lure of luxury stimulated the division of labor and the creation of new 
markets. 
 
That none of the economic historians of all denominations who have postulated innumerable 
theories to explain why capitalism rose in the West after the mercantilist period has ever 
provided one, all-encompassing explanation that fulfills all the complexities of the formation 
of the capitalist system is emblematic of the enormity of the problem.  Yet, we can surely 
observe the coincidence of the surge of luxury and the expansion of capitalism.  Sombart’s 
Luxury and Capitalism, in this respect, remains an alluring book, but, it is equally true that 
one encouraged the other, and, therefore, to find out which came first may be impossible.  It is 
time we understood that finding a definitive explanation may be a chimerical pursuit; and that 
all theories, no matter how compelling, are but threads of the enormously intricate tapestry 
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